Taipei Times - archives
The second round of negotiations on a proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China opened yesterday in Dasi (大溪), Taoyuan County, amid scuffles between police and protesters who accused the government of attempting to sell out Taiwan.
against ma's government sell Taiwan out to red China, create a new democratic country ROT.
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【特偵組串聯辜仲諒,以不實口供栽贓陳水扁貪汙】【3億實未給扁,辜仲諒說謊】 大方 2011年4月21日下午12:48 Taiwan Heart 臺灣心 蕃薯情 ...
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Taipei Times - archives : "President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) yesterday said it was necessary to establish an anti-corruption commission foll...
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hsutung yang [GlobalForumIntl] 阿扁種稻,馬收割。(別忘了世運的無名英雄,阿扁總統) by Frank Liou Franz J Liou 2009年7月29日 上午 2:51 回覆: Globa...
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台灣極不公平的司法是人民最大公敵 Taiwan's extremely unfair judicial system is public enemy number one ...
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Taipei Times - archives : "A leading national security expert is calling for a major change in US policy toward Taiwan. “It is time for...
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Taipei Times - archives : "The US is seeking to take over two properties in New York and Virginia owned by former president Chen Shui-b...
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Taipei Times - archives : "Despite repeated displays of goodwill by the government of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) since it came to pow...
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Taipei Times - archives : "A Chinese dissident seeking refuge in Taiwan accused President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) of failing to speak up for...
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Taipei Times - archives : "“Aborigines will never be able to return home. They are compelled to live in separate places. We are on our ...
2010年3月31日 星期三
2010年3月26日 星期五
China threat
Taipei Times - archives
“The PLA has focused considerable effort on building up its integrated air defense capabilities and has deployed an increasing number of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU 2 along the Taiwan Strait,” Admiral Robert Willard said, confirming earlier reports by a Canadian defense magazine that said China has deployed eight battalions of advanced missile systems in Fujian Province.
“The PLA has focused considerable effort on building up its integrated air defense capabilities and has deployed an increasing number of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU 2 along the Taiwan Strait,” Admiral Robert Willard said, confirming earlier reports by a Canadian defense magazine that said China has deployed eight battalions of advanced missile systems in Fujian Province.
2010年3月24日 星期三
2010年3月18日 星期四
justice
Taipei Times - archivesFor example, Huang promised in the report that if anyone violates the principle of confidentiality in ongoing investigations, he would immediately look into the legal implications for their behavior in criminal and administrative law. This is a step in the right direction, although it might be difficult to put into practice. However, he will be able to win the public’s approval if he gives assurances that he will step down of his own accord if there are more information leaks even after he has had a shot at reprimanding previous offenders. It should also keep the people working for him in check.
2010年3月17日 星期三
liar ECFA
Taipei Times - archives“People in Taiwan are very much concerned about an ECFA, but strangely the government is keeping them in the dark,” he said during an interview in Washington, where he is currently visiting family.
2010年3月11日 星期四
China rolls out sticks and carrots
Taipei Times - archivesPublished on Taipei Times
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2010/03/11/2003467715
China rolls out sticks and carrots
By Paul Lin 林保華
Thursday, Mar 11, 2010, Page 8
China wants to absorb Taiwan. That’s its policy, which it calls “complete reunification” (完全統一). The policy will change as circumstances change. The basic strategy is a two-pronged approach of military force and the so-called “united front strategy,” a classic carrot-and-stick policy that is manifested in a variety of ways. Intimidation by violence is relatively simple, but Beijing can be more creative with the carrots.
What is the united front strategy? Put simply, it’s the use of underhanded tactics to divide the enemy, win over the majority and come down on the minority, in order to crush both — divide and conquer. In the past it spouted noble concepts like equality and justice, but then the world found out how Beijing ruled its own country. After that, it needed to offer some incentives to implement the united front policy. It had little choice.
Beijing has used these incentives to lure Taiwanese businesspeople, and dangled other carrots to tempt the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to move from opposing the communists to colluding with them. Fast forward to when President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) came to power, and even Beijing was surprised by how pro-China his administration became.
And so Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) collects incentives he can parcel out to Ma so he can keep up the litany of demands. An example is the promise to reduce restrictions on tourists, which fell through, leaving Ma having to make more concessions.
The same is happening with the signing of an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA). Meanwhile, we have not seen an actual improvement in diplomatic relations since Ma gave up and conceded to the use of “Chinese Taipei.”
There have been improvements in other regards, in that Ma is being rewarded for pressing on with his pro-China stance, but only because this very stance is being met with fierce opposition in Taiwan, and Ma’s popularity is sinking like a stone. These rewards are an emergency measure to prevent the government from crashing.
During the Typhoon Morakot disaster in August, Beijing offered to help, ostensibly to help the rescue efforts, but actually to gather some intelligence. When the US got wind of this it rushed a US rescue team to Taiwan to diffuse a potential crisis. Beijing wasn’t happy, and is still fuming.
In mid-November, Zheng Bijian (鄭必堅) from Hu’s staff came to Taipei with some retired generals to take part in the first round of cross-strait talks, where they blasted the pro-independence faction. One week later, Chinese Major General Luo Yuan (援), a known hawk, publicly accused Ma of following a policy of “peaceful secession” with his “three noes” — no unification, no independence, and no use of force — obliging Ma to backtrack.
Then there was another perceptible shift. When China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) made his second visit to Taiwan, he was met not only by protests from Taiwanese but also Ma’s inability to quell unrest within his own party. When the US sold arms to Taiwan, Beijing blamed the US for selling, not Ma for buying, making allowances for him.
During the Lunar New Year break Hu went to Fujian to address Taiwanese businesspeople there, dangling still more carrots. After this, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) made concessions to speed up the ECFA process.
Wouldn’t it be nice if these were offered with no strings attached? Unfortunately, there were two conditions: First, Taiwan was to accept the “one China” principle, and second, China was to get something in return down the road.
For the first condition, Beijing was not actually asking for a written acceptance of the “one China” principle, but more of a tacit agreement — which would have gone on record nonetheless — and a public announcement that Taiwan accepted the principle. Although this would not be a formal agreement, the government would have a difficult time backtracking on it and would end up hoist by its own petard.
For the second condition, Beijing stands to lose precious little, but gain a huge amount. It says there will be a temporary ban on importing Chinese agricultural products in Taiwan, but this means the Taiwanese market will be flooded in the future, putting local farmers at a distinct disadvantage, unless the ECFA includes a clause stating the ban would be in place for 50 years. This is another reason why we need a referendum on the ECFA.
Paul Lin is a political commentator.
TRANSLATED BY PAUL COOPER
Copyright © 1999-2010 The Taipei Times. All rights reserved.
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2010/03/11/2003467715
China rolls out sticks and carrots
By Paul Lin 林保華
Thursday, Mar 11, 2010, Page 8
China wants to absorb Taiwan. That’s its policy, which it calls “complete reunification” (完全統一). The policy will change as circumstances change. The basic strategy is a two-pronged approach of military force and the so-called “united front strategy,” a classic carrot-and-stick policy that is manifested in a variety of ways. Intimidation by violence is relatively simple, but Beijing can be more creative with the carrots.
What is the united front strategy? Put simply, it’s the use of underhanded tactics to divide the enemy, win over the majority and come down on the minority, in order to crush both — divide and conquer. In the past it spouted noble concepts like equality and justice, but then the world found out how Beijing ruled its own country. After that, it needed to offer some incentives to implement the united front policy. It had little choice.
Beijing has used these incentives to lure Taiwanese businesspeople, and dangled other carrots to tempt the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to move from opposing the communists to colluding with them. Fast forward to when President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) came to power, and even Beijing was surprised by how pro-China his administration became.
And so Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) collects incentives he can parcel out to Ma so he can keep up the litany of demands. An example is the promise to reduce restrictions on tourists, which fell through, leaving Ma having to make more concessions.
The same is happening with the signing of an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA). Meanwhile, we have not seen an actual improvement in diplomatic relations since Ma gave up and conceded to the use of “Chinese Taipei.”
There have been improvements in other regards, in that Ma is being rewarded for pressing on with his pro-China stance, but only because this very stance is being met with fierce opposition in Taiwan, and Ma’s popularity is sinking like a stone. These rewards are an emergency measure to prevent the government from crashing.
During the Typhoon Morakot disaster in August, Beijing offered to help, ostensibly to help the rescue efforts, but actually to gather some intelligence. When the US got wind of this it rushed a US rescue team to Taiwan to diffuse a potential crisis. Beijing wasn’t happy, and is still fuming.
In mid-November, Zheng Bijian (鄭必堅) from Hu’s staff came to Taipei with some retired generals to take part in the first round of cross-strait talks, where they blasted the pro-independence faction. One week later, Chinese Major General Luo Yuan (援), a known hawk, publicly accused Ma of following a policy of “peaceful secession” with his “three noes” — no unification, no independence, and no use of force — obliging Ma to backtrack.
Then there was another perceptible shift. When China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) made his second visit to Taiwan, he was met not only by protests from Taiwanese but also Ma’s inability to quell unrest within his own party. When the US sold arms to Taiwan, Beijing blamed the US for selling, not Ma for buying, making allowances for him.
During the Lunar New Year break Hu went to Fujian to address Taiwanese businesspeople there, dangling still more carrots. After this, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) made concessions to speed up the ECFA process.
Wouldn’t it be nice if these were offered with no strings attached? Unfortunately, there were two conditions: First, Taiwan was to accept the “one China” principle, and second, China was to get something in return down the road.
For the first condition, Beijing was not actually asking for a written acceptance of the “one China” principle, but more of a tacit agreement — which would have gone on record nonetheless — and a public announcement that Taiwan accepted the principle. Although this would not be a formal agreement, the government would have a difficult time backtracking on it and would end up hoist by its own petard.
For the second condition, Beijing stands to lose precious little, but gain a huge amount. It says there will be a temporary ban on importing Chinese agricultural products in Taiwan, but this means the Taiwanese market will be flooded in the future, putting local farmers at a distinct disadvantage, unless the ECFA includes a clause stating the ban would be in place for 50 years. This is another reason why we need a referendum on the ECFA.
Paul Lin is a political commentator.
TRANSLATED BY PAUL COOPER
Copyright © 1999-2010 The Taipei Times. All rights reserved.
2010年3月5日 星期五
liar ma
Taipei Times - archives
http://help.funp.com/lib/exe/fetch.php/funp/tools/tools_postbtn_script.png?cache=cacheWhen Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) was president of Taiwan, he introduced a policy called “innovation and protection of Taiwan” in response to the political situation at the time. Writing about the Kaohsiung Incident in Biographical Literature magazine, Ruan Da-ren (阮大仁), who had close connections with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), made some interesting revelations. Apparently, when the incident broke out, Chiang’s Taiwanese staff were sickened by what was happening. There was one voice among them, that of Hsieh Tung-min (謝東閔), the first Taiwanese to serve as vice president, who suggested “the firing squad for the lot of ’em.”
http://help.funp.com/lib/exe/fetch.php/funp/tools/tools_postbtn_script.png?cache=cacheWhen Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) was president of Taiwan, he introduced a policy called “innovation and protection of Taiwan” in response to the political situation at the time. Writing about the Kaohsiung Incident in Biographical Literature magazine, Ruan Da-ren (阮大仁), who had close connections with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), made some interesting revelations. Apparently, when the incident broke out, Chiang’s Taiwanese staff were sickened by what was happening. There was one voice among them, that of Hsieh Tung-min (謝東閔), the first Taiwanese to serve as vice president, who suggested “the firing squad for the lot of ’em.”
2010年3月3日 星期三
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